A series of events took place in Turkiye last week. First, Devlet Bahçeli, the chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), one of the main partners of the People’s Union, made a surprising statement in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, announcing that PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, who is imprisoned in a high-security facility, demanded his release. He has been in prison since 1999 and has called on the PKK to “lay down their arms and end terrorism.” More interestingly, Mr. Bahçeli suggested that Mr. Öcalan should come to parliament and make this call from the party platform of the Democratic Party of People’s Equality (DEM Party). This development has led to the interpretation that a new process may have begun.
Immediately after Bahçeli’s statement, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued more measured comments, calling for the continuation of the de-escalation and normalization process involving all parties that had been started earlier. President Erdoğan has been referring to developments in the Middle East for some time and stressing the need to keep the domestic front strong.
Bahçeli and Erdoğan’s statements were supported by the DEM party, but the leader of the main opposition party met Selahattin Demirtaş, a prominent figure in Kurdish politics, in prison and expressed support for the continuation of this new political situation.
However, on October 23, a terrorist attack occurred in Ankara targeting TUSAŞ, one of the main companies in Turkiye’s defense industry.
nothing is a coincidence
What do we know so far about the TUSAŞ attack in Turkiye?
Both terrorists involved in the attack are confirmed PKK members and were recruited within Turkiye. One of the attackers, a female terrorist, was the leader of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) (now DEM) in Hakkari Central district before being recruited by the PKK.
Security sources believe the attackers entered Turkiye recently. They are suspected of entering Turkiye from Syria, possibly using paramotors to facilitate the crossing. All of the attackers are believed to have received specialized training in Syria.
Reconnaissance and monitoring of this attack may have been conducted using digital intelligence techniques. It is also suspected that they received accurate information on the attack site, although other people may be involved in this aspect.
The targeting of TUSAŞ suggests that important defense projects may have been the focus.
The timing of the attack is believed to be a response to recent calls for the PKK to disarm. Turkiye’s airstrikes are currently targeting YPG military and infrastructure facilities in Syria, and operations are expected to continue.
The DEM party has condemned the attack and signaled support for the internal peace process, but it is believed that maintaining this position could be difficult for the party.
Several issues can be analyzed by focusing on the points highlighted above. The first question is whether MHP leader Bahçeli’s telephone conversation was planned.
President Erdoğan’s comments after Bahçeli’s remarks indicate that the government has not decided to start a new process. This strengthens the idea that Bahçeli acted independently.
President Erdoğan’s call to keep the domestic front strong is aimed at promoting a new era of political and social détente by reducing the deep polarization between political actors in Turkish politics. But Israeli aggression in Gaza and Lebanon and the potential impact of the Israeli-Iranian conflict in Syria are of concern to Turkiye.
Rather than adapting to the scenarios that may arise from these developments, the Turkish government appears to be positioning itself to directly control the situation. The government has not lowered its priority on fighting terrorism. On the contrary, after the TUSAŞ attack, it appears to be engaging in a more focused and comprehensive counterterrorism policy.
Is a new peace process possible?
The settlement/peace process (2013-2015) aimed at the PKK finally abandoning armed struggle and laying down its weapons. This process was aimed at stopping the PKK’s armed activities and finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan called for a ceasefire from prison in 2013, and the PKK began withdrawing from Turkish territory. The government held consultations with Kurdish political representatives and civil society organizations. The most important part of this process was direct negotiations with the PKK.
However, the process collapsed by 2015 due to the domestic political situation and the impact of the Syrian conflict. Following the terrorist attack on two Turkish police officers, the government launched a major military operation against the PKK and the conflict resumed.
There were many reasons behind the failure of the resolution process. Among the most important are the lack of a comprehensive roadmap towards a final solution, public opposition to negotiations with the PKK, lack of support from opposition parties, and lack of timely constitutional action; This includes the PKK’s views on the Syrian uprising. As an opportunity for the PYD and YPG to gain influence there. PKK’s extremist demands. Despite the ceasefire, the PKK has a policy of arming, radicalizing civilians, and creating alternative power structures to counter state military and security forces through its youth organizations in many cities in southeastern Turkiye. And it did not involve the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the peace process.
Given the lessons learned from the 2013-2015 peace process, it seems unlikely that the new process will be similar. One of the most important reasons is that the government has not defined the events of recent weeks as a new process. However, the strategic It is also clear that a roadmap has not yet been formed.
Another reason is the PKK’s position. The terrorist attack on Tusas shows that the PKK has no intention of laying down its arms and ending terrorism. Even if Abdullah Öcalan calls for disarmament, internal disagreements within the organization could prevent a new process from continuing. From a Kurdish political perspective, the DEM party’s autonomy from the PKK also has serious limitations. The DEM party’s failure to sign the parliamentary condemnation of the TUSAŞ attack illustrates these limitations.
However, the continued presence of the PKK in Syria appears to be one of the most significant obstacles to a new peace process. For example, even if the PKK were to disarm in northern Iraq, it is unclear how PKK elements within the YPG would be separated.
The main weakness of the new process may be social support. Gaining public support for the new process may be difficult for all political parties.
Given the above, there are significant obstacles to starting a new process, and these obstacles are unlikely to be overcome in the short term.
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